Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has intensified efforts to normalize relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a leader he once called a “terrorist.” This surprising U-turn raises a critical question: what would a Turkey-Syria rapprochement mean for Syrian Kurds, who are seen as a common adversary by both governments?
The Kurdish Dilemma Amid Rapprochement
For over a decade, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), have governed northeast Syria (Rojava). While the Assad regime initially avoided clashes with the Kurds, Turkey labeled the Kurdish-led administration a threat, backing Syrian rebel factions that frequently turned their guns against Kurdish forces.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), born from the power vacuum during the civil war, gave Kurds long-denied cultural and political rights. Yet, Erdogan views this self-rule project as an existential danger to Turkey’s national security.
Turkey and Assad’s Common Enemy: The Kurds
Despite years of hostility, Erdogan and Assad share a deep mistrust of Kurdish self-governance. Both governments describe Kurdish fighters as “terrorists.” Analysts argue that any Ankara-Damascus reconciliation could potentially target Kurdish achievements—though U.S. military presence in Syria complicates such plans.
Turkey has already launched three major offensives against the YPG, the backbone of the SDF, capturing cities such as Afrin and Ras al-Ain. Erdogan has repeatedly threatened further incursions, but economic troubles at home have slowed his ambitions.
Kurdish Political Exclusion and Fragile Dialogue
The Democratic Union Party (PYD), political arm of the YPG, has been systematically excluded from UN-backed peace talks—mainly due to Turkish pressure. Sporadic negotiations between the Kurds and Damascus have failed, while U.S.-sponsored unity talks between the ENKS (Kurdish National Council) and PYD have collapsed.
Kurdish representatives stress that any Syria solution must include them. “Talks should not exclude the Kurds or suppress their demands,” said DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakirhan. Yet, Ankara remains unwilling to recognize Kurdish political legitimacy.
The Role of the United States and Russia
Washington maintains roughly 900 troops in Syria, supporting Kurdish forces against ISIS and preventing a Turkish-Assad military alignment. However, U.S. reliability remains uncertain. Former President Donald Trump nearly withdrew troops in 2019, leaving Kurds exposed to Turkish attacks. Experts warn that a future U.S. policy shift could again put Kurdish self-rule at risk.
Meanwhile, Russia—Assad’s main backer—acts as a mediator between Ankara and Damascus. Moscow’s goals are complex: it seeks Assad’s survival, Turkey’s cooperation, and leverage against the West amid its own war in Ukraine.
Domestic Pressures Driving Erdogan
Inside Turkey, rising anti-Syrian refugee sentiment and economic hardship push Erdogan toward reconciliation with Assad. Sending refugees back to Syria has become a central domestic demand. Erdogan, weakened by local election losses, sees rapprochement as a potential way to ease political pressure.
Yet, experts caution that Assad cannot be trusted. “His regime will remain an enemy to Turkey for as long as he is in power,” said Joel Rayburn, former U.S. envoy for Syria.
What’s at Stake for Syrian Kurds
For Syrian Kurds, the Erdogan-Assad talks are filled with uncertainty. A deal could mean Turkey’s withdrawal—something Kurds have long desired—but also open the door for Assad’s forces to re-enter Kurdish areas, threatening their autonomy.
As researcher Amy Austin Holmes notes, Erdogan’s real aim may be to “crush” Rojava. Yet many displaced Syrians hope that Turkish withdrawal would allow them to return home.
In the end, an Erdogan-Assad rapprochement presents both risks and opportunities for Syrian Kurds. Their fragile autonomy, gained at great cost, remains under threat as Ankara, Damascus, Washington, and Moscow maneuver for influence in war-torn Syria.
